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Negotiation to Execute Continuous Long-Term Tasks
Valeriia Haberland and Simon Miles and Michael Luck1
Abstract. Recently, research has focused on processing tasks that
require continuous execution to produce data in a real-time manner.
Such tasks often also need to be executed for long periods of time
such as years, requiring large amounts of resources (e.g. CPUs) that
can be found in a Grid. However, a Grid may be unwilling or unable
to allocate resources for continuous usage far in advance, because
of high ﬂuctuations in resource availability and/or resource demand.
Therefore, a client must relax its requirements in terms of long-term
execution, and negotiate a shorter period of execution time; when
this period ends, the client must negotiate again to continue task’s
execution. We propose a negotiation strategy, ConTask, which helps
to increase the periods of execution time, and reduce the length of
interruptions between them.
1 INTRODUCTION
Much work is being undertaken on processing data streams from sen-
sors, e.g. those that monitor air pollution [5]. It is desirable for these
data streams to be processed continuously for long periods in order to
control, e.g. environmental parameters such as temperature. The pro-
cessing of these data streams must avoid interruptions of such length
that signiﬁcant changes to the environment may occur without being
noticed. The tasks that process such data streams continuously are
considered in our work to be continuous tasks. Some research seeks
to ﬁnd an optimal schedule for multiple continuous processes (e.g.
continuous mixing of feedstock, packing) to utilise some resources
(e.g. equipment) on plants [2], while other research addresses a dy-
namic area partitioning among a group of robots in order to monitor it
continuously in respect of some events of interest (e.g. gas leaks) [1].
A Grid [4] potentially offers more resources (e.g. CPUs) than any
supercomputer or cluster. However, a Grid might be unable or unwill-
ing to schedule long-term tasks for the whole requested time dura-
tion, because resources could be required by other clients and cannot
be monopolised by one client for as long as, e.g. one year. Such task
will likely be allocated the execution time which is shorter than it was
requested and this task will experience a planned interruption when
this period ends. A client’s role in task execution increases when it
can negotiate its requirements with a resource provider, where both
negotiators may use different strategies to achieve their goals. In our
work, a negotiation is bilateral and starts as soon as a client’s task
has been interrupted. A Grid Resource Allocator (GRA) represents
a resource provider and a Client Agent represents a client in negotia-
tion, where both are autonomous agents. Time-dependent strategies,
e.g. [3,6], naturally express many real-life tasks that depend on time.
However, if the end of negotiation is uncertain, but the duration of ne-
gotiation is crucial by itself, e.g. for a continuous task’s interruption,
then the existing time-dependent strategies do not solve this problem.
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This paper presents a formal model of continuous task execution
and the main ideas behind a negotiation strategy, ConTask, which al-
lows a client to relax the last best proposal of the GRA (or its own)
to start the next interruption period at the approximate maximum re-
source availability, where this maximum is estimated based on peri-
odic patterns in resource availability ﬂuctuations. ConTask also con-
siders whether the current duration of interruption, as well as its cu-
mulative duration (including all previous interruptions), is too long.
In general, a client becomes more generous in negotiation when an
interruption is too long.
2 FORMAL MODEL
This section provides a formal model for continuous execution of
a task, including a client’s utility. The start time of task execution
tstrtot is when a client has submitted its ﬁrst request for resources to
a Grid, while the end time for the whole long-term duration of task
execution is tendtot . Each task imay have several interruption(s) within
τ tot = tendtot − tstrtot , which are not simultaneous for multiple tasks.
Each adjoined pair
(
τ inti , τ
exe
i
)
l
of a single interruption τ inti,l and
execution τexei,l periods of time for continuous task i, where an in-
terruption period of time precedes a corresponding execution period
of time, has its counter l = 1, 2, 3, ... within τ tot. Here, each τexei,l
starts at tstri,l and ends at t
end
i,l . A cumulative duration of interruption
τ cumi,l =
∑l
k=1 τ
int
i,k is the sum of all interruption durations from the
ﬁrst until the lth prior to the execution period τexei,l , and it reﬂects
success of the client’s strategy over total execution time.
The utility gained by a client for each execution period τexei,l is neg-
atively affected by two factors: a duration of preceding interruption
τ inti,l ; a cumulative duration of preceding interruptions τ
cum
i,l . Effec-
tiveness function Ei,l (t) shows the success level of execution of task
i as a process over time within each execution period τexei,l , assigning
a value from the range [0, 1] to each point in time t. The effectiveness
function increases linearly when the task is running (during τexei,l )
and does not change when the task is interrupted (during τ inti,l ). The
length of interruptions affects the values of the effectiveness function
during the following execution period.
The impact of the length of interruption on the following exe-
cution period is calculated with damping functions SI
(
τ inti,l
)
and
CI
(
τ cumi,l
)
in the range [0, 1] for a single and cumulative inter-
ruptions respectively. The values of these functions decrease dur-
ing the interruption period towards zero. Consequently, these func-
tions are presented as SI
(
τ inti,l
)
= 1/
(
e(τ
int
i,l −τmaxint )/int + 1
)
andCI
(
τ cumi,l
)
= 1/
(
e(τ
cum
i,l −τmaxcum )/cum + 1
)
, where τmaxint and
τmaxcum are the durations of single and cumulative interruptions after
which an increment of client utility in respect of the following ex-
ecution period decreases in more than a half of its possible value,
compared to the case when an execution period was allocated at once
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after a task had been interrupted, while int and cum determine the
speed of decrease of these functions around τmaxint and τ
max
cum .
The effectiveness function Ei,l (t) increases in the range from the
level of effectiveness Ei,l−1
(
tendi,l−1
)
, achieved by a task before in-
terruption τ inti,l at time t
end
i,l−1, multiplied by the values of functions
SI
(
τ inti,l
)
and CI
(
τ cumi,l
)
, towards the largest possible effective-
ness 1 at time tendtot in the time interval t ∈
[
tstri,l , t
end
i,l
]
, as below
if j ≡ l − 1:
Ei,l (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
[(
1− Ei,j
(
tendi,j
))
t+ Ei,j
(
tendi,j
)
tendtot − tstri,l
tendtot − tstri,l
]
×
×SI
(
τ inti,l
)
× CI (τ cumi,l ) , if t ∈ [tstri,l , tendi,l ] ,
Ei,j
(
tendi,j
)
, if t ∈
]
tendi,j , t
str
i,l
[
.
(1)
Client utility Ui for a task i is the sum of all squares under the effec-
tiveness function for the execution periods in proportion to the max-
imum possible square when a task does not have any interruptions,
and is shown in Equation (2).
Ui =
1
τ tot
Li∑
l=1
(
Ei,l
(
tstri,l
)
+ Ei,l
(
tendi,l
))
× τexei,l , (2)
where Li is the total number of interruption-execution pairs within
τ tot, and the average utility Uaver = 1/N
∑N
i=1 Ui for N tasks.
3 NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
An objective of our ConTask strategy for a client is to decrease the
length of interruptions and increase the length of executions, while
not losing signiﬁcant utility. A client and GRA adopt an alternating
proposals protocol [8], where the negotiators exchange proposals in
turns, and both can either accept the opponent’s proposal or quit.
In our case, the ﬁnal deadline of negotiation is unknown, because a
client must negotiate with the GRA until it obtains resources, but is
time-dependent in terms of the length of interruption. Hence, we use
time-dependent strategies [7] with nominally chosen deadlines, and
negotiations repeat until an agreement is reached. Traditionally, an
agreement is considered to be reached when the negotiator’s utility
for the current opponent’s proposal is higher than for the next pos-
sible negotiator’s proposal. We propose to take a different approach
when a client does not always accept a proposal which is more bene-
ﬁcial than its own next proposal, but may concede further by offering
a shorter execution period to the GRA in order to end it at the approx-
imate maximum resource availability, according to its periodic pat-
tern. This decision reﬂects the continuity of task execution, because
a client tends to reduce all possible interruptions within τ tot. The
best offered execution period τexe
′
i,l is the last proposal of the GRA
(or a client), which is to be accepted by a client or which is already
accepted by the GRA, but has not yet been conﬁrmed by a client. A
client may offer a shorter τexei,l < τ
exe′
i,l , but only on as long as to
reach the closest maximum from the end of τexe
′
i,l .
A client may also need to control the durations of interruptions
if it is difﬁcult to estimate the maximum resource availability. A
client has to decide when single or cumulative interruptions are too
long to reach an agreement faster. The values of damping functions
SI
(
τ inti,l (t)
)
and CI
(
τ cumi,l (t)
)
can be calculated during task’s in-
terruption at time t to ensure that their values have not signiﬁcantly
fallen towards 0. Assume that a client deﬁnes the sensitivity thresh-
olds χint and χcum with respect to a single and cumulative interrup-
tions respectively. As soon as the difference between the value of any
damping function and its largest possible value 1 at time t becomes
larger than χint for SI
(
τ inti,l (t)
)
and / or χcum for CI
(
τ cumi,l (t)
)
,
a client concludes that the interruption is long enough to signiﬁcantly
affect its utility.
A client becomes more or less generous in negotiation, based on
our evaluation function with three criteria: C0i,l (t) [7], which shows
the risk of resource exhaustion; C1i,l (t) and C
2
i,l (t) (new criteria),
which show whether the length of the current single or cumulative in-
terruption is too long. Our evaluation function points out the longest
negotiation (a client least generous) among all fuzzy sets combina-
tions [7] when C0i,l (t) ≥ 0, C1i,l (t) ≥ 0 and C2i,l (t) ≥ 0, which
means no too long interruptions and no risk of resource exhaustion
at time t, or it points out the shortest negotiation (a client most gen-
erous) when at least one of the criteria is negative. Table 1 shows the
average client utilities over 100 tasks, when the GRA’s reservation
value (i.e. the longest duration of time it may offer) ﬂuctuates more
randomly or more periodically, according to the resource availability
changes. The larger its maximal possible deviation, the more random
its ﬂuctuations over time. The results show that our ConTask strat-
Table 1. The average client utility for different negotiation strategies.
Maximal deviation,% ConTask,×10−4 No ConTask,×10−4
1 9.93 4.46
10 6.80 3.49
50 4.25 1.67
egy “ConTask” with the sensitivity thresholds 0.2 outperforms our
previous strategy “No ConTask” [7] for all deviations.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper described our model of continuous long-term tasks execu-
tion in a Grid and, in general, our new ConTask negotiation strategy
that allows near-continuity to be maintained among these tasks when
they are running by increasing the duration of continuous running
and by reducing planned interruptions.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Ahmadi and P. Stone, ‘A multi-robot system for continuous area
sweeping tasks’, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference
on Robotics and Automation, pp. 1724–1729, (2006).
[2] P. M. Castro, A. P. Barbosa-Po´voa, H. A. Matos, and A. Q. Novais, ‘Sim-
ple continuous-time formulation for short-term scheduling of batch and
continuous processes’, Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research,
43(1), 105–118, (2004).
[3] P. Faratin, C. Sierra, and N. R. Jennings, ‘Negotiation decision func-
tions for autonomous agents’, Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 24(3-
4), 159 –182, (1998).
[4] I. Foster, C. Kesselman, and S. Tuecke, ‘The anatomy of the grid: En-
abling scalable virtual organizations’, International Journal of High Per-
formance Computing Applications, 15, 200–222, (2001).
[5] M. Ghanem, Y. Guo, J. Hassard, M. Osmond, and M. Richards, ‘Sen-
sor grids for air pollution monitoring’, in Proceeding of the 3rd UK e-
Science All Hands Meeting, (2004).
[6] V. Haberland, S. Miles, and M. Luck, ‘Adaptive negotiation for re-
source intensive tasks in grids’, in Proceedings of the 6th Starting AI
Researchers’ Symposium, pp. 125–136, (2012).
[7] V. Haberland, S. Miles, and M. Luck, ‘Using adjustable fuzzy inference
for adaptive grid resource negotiation’, in Proceedings of the 6th AA-
MAS International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Ne-
gotiations, Minnesota, USA, (2013).
[8] A. Rubinstein, ‘Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model’, Economet-
rica, 50(1), 97–109, (1982).
V. Haberland et al. / Negotiation to Execute Continuous Long-Term Tasks1020
